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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LAWS ENACTED
BY POPULAR VOTE*
The initiative and referendum' are enjoying a political renaissance in
America. These instruments of direct democracy are appearing on state
and local ballots with increasing frequency and subject matter variety. 2
While the historical rationale for the initiative and referendum was to
* This comment was inspired by the 1978 Washington Law Review Lecture by Professor Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., reprinted in Bell, The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH.
L. REv. 1 (1978).
1. Political scientist George S. Blair defines the initiative and referendum as follows:
[IThe initiative is a device whereby a prescribed number or percent of the qualified voters,
through the use of a petition, may have an amendment or legislative proposal placed on the
ballot for adoption or rejection by the electorate of the state or local community. The referen-
dum, on the other hand, is a means by which decisions of legislative bodies do not become
public policies until the electorate votes its concurrence with the policies and accepts them by
the required affirmative vote.
G. BLAIR, AmERIcAN LEGISLATURES: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 392 (1967).
Initiatives may be constitutional, allowing citizens to amend their state's constitution, or statu-
tory. Statutory initiatives may be direct, permitting citizens to enact a statute without the involve-
ment of the legislature, or indirect, giving the legislature an opportunity to enact a proposed or a
substitute measure or to resubmit the question to the voters. See generally H. BONE, THE INITIATIVE
AND THE REFERENDUM 1-3 (National Municipal League, State Constitutional Studies Project, 2d ed.
1975). A referendum may be required by petition of the voters or by state constitution, or the
legislature itself may order a statute it has enacted submitted to the voters for approval or rejection.
Id. at 2; THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNIEN-rs, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1978-79, at 245 n.a (1978)
[hereinafter cited as THE BOOK OF THE STATES].
Twenty-one state constitutions provide for statutory initiatives. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARIZ.
CONsT. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1; ARK. CONST. amend. 7, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. V,
§ 1; IDAHO CONST. art. 3, § I; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18; MAss. CONST. amend. XLVIII, pt. I,
§ 150; MIcH. CONST. art. II, § 9; Mo. CONsT. art. 3, § 49; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 4; NEB. CONST.
art. III, § 2; NEv. CONST. art. 19, § 2; N.D. CoNsr. art. II, § 25; OHIo CONST. art. II, § 1;OKLA.
CONST. art. V, § 2; OR. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2(a); S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1; UTAH CONsT. art. VI, §
1; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(a); Wyo. CONST. art. 3, § 52. See generally H. BONE, supra at 20-53;
THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra at 243; PEoPLE's LOBBY, NATIONAL INITIATIVE AND VOTE OF CONFIDENCE
(RECALL) 99-200 (1974). Voters may initiate legislation directly in 13 of these states, indirectly in
five, and by either process in three. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra at 243.
Fifteen of the aforementioned states, plus Florida and Illinois, provide for constitutional amend-
ment by initiative. Id. at 210. Twenty-three states authorize a direct referendum by petition of the
people. In an additional 16 states, the referendum is available subject to significant procedural or
substantive constraints, e.g., only upon referral by the legislature, or only upon certain issues. Id. at
244-45. See also H. BONE, supra at 20-53. Concerning procedural mechanics of initiatives and re-
ferenda, see generally Note, Initiatives and Referendum-Do They Encourage or Impair Better State
Government?, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 925, 926-37 (1977).
The discussion which follows emphasizes the initiative, which is used much more extensively
than is the referendum. Price, The Initiative: A Comparative State Analysis and Reassessment of a
Western Phenomenon, 28 W. POL. Q. 243, 245 (1975).
2. See notes 30-40 and accompanying text infra.
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check the abuses of representative government, 3 these legislative devices
also allow circumvention of the procedural safeguards attending legisla-
tion through representative processes. 4 Without these safeguards the
rights of minorities, and civil liberties generally, are acutely vulnerable
to oppression by an anonymous majority of voters. Recent experience
with the initiative and referendum indicates that this dangerous potential
is being realized. 5
This comment examines the thesis that the political process by which
laws are enacted has constitutional significance and concludes that legis-
lation enacted directly by voters warrants heightened judicial scrutiny un-
der the fourteenth amendment. Part I chronicles the historical develop-
ment of the initiative and referendum and surveys contemporary
applications. Parts II and III examine the political underpinnings and
ramifications of direct democracy and the constitutionality of the initia-
tive process. Finally, Part IV proposes a constitutional law framework
for heightened judicial scrutiny of laws enacted by popular vote.
I. EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY USE OF
THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
A. Historical Context
The antecedents of the modern initiative and referendum predate re-
corded history. Pre-Roman European tribes legislated by "clash of
arms"; 6 popular assemblies governed Athens; 7 and the Romans con-
ducted referenda as early as the eighth century B.C. 8 and contributed the
word "plebiscite" to the lexicon of direct democracy. 9
The Swiss were the architects of the modern initiative and referendum.
The cantonal Landsgemeinde (folkmoot), an annual territorial assembly
3. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 49-55 and accompanying text infra and Part II infra.
5. See notes 41-48 and accompanying text infra.
6. Shafer, A Teutonic Institution Revived, 22 YALE L.J. 398, 399 (1913). At tribal meetings
only the chiefs spoke, but all freemen could "vote" in this ancient version of "sabre-rattling"; the
side making the greater clamor prevailed on the issue. S. ALDERSON, YEA OR NAY? REFERENDA IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM 10 (1975).
7. D. WiLcox, GOVERNMENT BY ALLTHE PEOPLE 3-4 (1912).
8. S. ALDERSON, supra note 6.
9. Id. A plebiscite, which is a general expression of public opinion not confined to a particular
issue, may be distinguished from a referendum in that the former is broader in scope and usually
advisory rather than binding. J. GRIMOND & B. NEvE, THE REFERENDUM 53-54 (1975). For an account
of the plebiscite as a totalitarian device, see id. at 54-57.
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of citizens with supreme legislative authority, dates back to 1309.10 Stat-
utory initiatives and referenda appeared in the early nineteenth century at
the canton level." The referendum was incorporated into the Swiss fed-
eral Constitution in 1874, and the right to amend the constitution by
initiative was established in 1891.12 The Swiss model has garnered both
admirers and detractors, 13 but there is consensus on the point that Ameri-
can initiatives and referenda were patterned on the Swiss prototypes. 14
The Declaration of Independence predicates government legitimacy
upon "the consent of the governed." 15 The New England town meeting
is routinely cited as a colonial institutionalization of this concept and as a
forerunner of modern direct democracy, 16 although the notion may be
more romantic than factual in light of the localized scope, homogenous
demographics, and premeeting consensus that characterized the town
meeting. 17 Sporadic American experimentation with initiatives and refer-
enda, particularly on a local level, occurred in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, 18 and state constitutions and amendments have gener-
ally been subject to popular ratification. 19
In the 1890's direct democracy emerged as a full-blown American
10. L. TALLIAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OFTHE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND
RECALL PROCESS 10 (1977).
11. Note, Zoning and the Referendum: Converging Powers, Conflicting Processes, 6 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 97, 109 n.130 (1977).
12. S. ALDERSON, supra note 6, at 18. The Swiss federal Constitution does not authorize national
statutory initiatives, but there are no subject matter restrictions on constitutional amendment initia-
tives. "This explains why the Swiss Constitution contains a clause on the slaughter of animals." Id.
Contrary to the American heritage of Marbury v. Madison, 2 U.S. (1 Cranch) 60 (1803), the Swiss
have, by initiative, denied their Supreme Court the authority to examine laws for constitutionality.
S. ALDERSON, supra at 5.
13. Compare S. ALDERSON, supra note 6, at 5 ("Critics of the referendum must reckon with the
fact that Switzerland, which makes the most use of it, is noted for political stability, law-abiding-
ness, respect for liberal values, and a lack of bellicosity-this despite profound linguistic and
religious divisions.") with L. TALLIAN, supra note 10, at 16 ("A study of direct legislation in Switzer-
land will convince one that the initiative is a conservative force; for example, woman's suffrage
came as late as 1971.").
14. 123 CONG. REc. S11,582 (daily ed. July 11, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Abourezk); S. ALDER-
SON, supra note 6, at 18. The Swiss devotion to direct democracy is exemplified by Rousseau's pos-
tulate: "Every law which the people in person have not ratified is invalid; it is not a law ...." J.
RousseAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), quoted in C. LOBINGIER, THE PEOPLE'S LAW 9 (1909). See
generally E. OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA 1-4 (1912).
15. "We hold these truths to be self-evident.... That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed .... Declara-
tion of Independence (1776).
16. E.g., D. WILcox, supra note 7, at 4-5; Note, supra note 11, at 105-07.
17. Bell, The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 15-16
(1978); Note, supra note 11, at 106.
18. C. LOBINGIER, THE PEOPLE'S LAW 358 (1909).
19. J. GRIMOND & B. NEVE, supra note 9, at 61.
177
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political movement, fueled by the philosophy and rhetoric of the Popu-
lists and the Progressives. 20 The purification of state politics, aimed at
corrupt bosses and overreaching special interest groups, 2' was to be ac-
complished by making "every man his own legislature." 22 In 1898
South Dakota became, by constitutional amendment, the first state to
provide for statewide statutory initiatives and referenda. 23 Amid spirited
public debate24 a succession of states, mostly western, enacted similar
20. See generally R. Benedict, Some Aspects of the Direct Legislation Process in Washington
State: Theory and Practice 1914-1973 (August 7, 1975) (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation in Suzzallo
Library, University of Washington).
The Populists and the Progressives conceptualized direct legislation somewhat differently. The
Populists characterized ballot legislation as "interest group pluralism," according greater influence to
groups on the periphery of power. Id. at 55. They were substantially responsible for the first state
constitutional amendment, in South Dakota in 1898, authorizing initiatives. Note, supra note 1I. at
109. See note 23 infra (text of South Dakota amendment). The Progressives embraced the concept of
the" 'political man,' the rational being who by obtaining information and reflecting on issues under
consideration by the community, would make decisions according to the criteria of the greatest good
for the greatest number." Benedict, supra at 58-59. Although the Progressives were divided on the
desirability of direct legislation, their leading spokesperson, Theodore Roosevelt. strongly advo-
cated its careful and selective use. Note, supra note II, at 110.
21. J. BARNETT, THE OPERATION OFTHE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL IN OREGON 4 (1915):
H. BONE, supra note 1, at I.
22. J. BARNETT, supra note 21, at 16 (quoting The Oregonian, June 28, 1906, at 8. col. 2). The
restriction of this remedy to men was underscored by the repeated refusal of Oregon voters to adopt
women's suffrage by initiative in 1906, 1908, and 1910. It was finally enacted in 1912 Id. at
241-47.
23. The constitutional amendment passed by the South Dakota legislature in 1897 provided that:
The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a legislature which shall consist of a sen-
ate and house of representatives except that the people expressly reserve to themselves the right
to propose measures which measures the Legislature shall enact and submit to a vote of the
electors of the state and also the right to require that any laws which the legislature may have
enacted shall be submitted to a vote of the electors of the state before going into effect (except
such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or
safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions).
1897 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. XXXIX, § 2, quoted in C. LOBINGIER, supra note 18, at 359. The mea-
sure was popularly adopted in 1898 by a vote of 23,816 to 16,483. E. OBERHOLTZER, supra note 14.
at 385, 392-93.
24. On the initiative and referendum as vehicles for governmental reform, compare the assess-
ments of California Governor Hiram Johnson and Woodrow Wilson:
If we can give to the people the means by which they may accomplish such other reforms as
they desire, the means as well by which they may prevent the misuse of the power temporarily
centralized in the Legislature . . . .then all that lies in our power will have been done in the
direction of safeguarding the future and for the perpetuation of the theory upon which we
ourselves shall conduct this government.
Inaugural Address of Governor Hiram Johnson (Jan. 4, 191 I), quoted in The Sacramento Bee, Jan.
4, 1911, reprinted in PEOPLE'S LoBBv, supra note I, at 29. In contrast, Wilson argued: "Where it
[the initiative] has been employed it has not promised either progress or enlightenment, leading
rather to doubtful experiments and to reactionary displays of prejudice than to really useful legisla-
tion." Woodrow Wilson, quoted in E. OBERHOLTZER, supra note 14, at 506. Often the debate.
through the use of vituperative epithets, generated more heat than light:
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provisions during the early 1900's. 25
Despite the frenzied enactment of constitutional amendments to autho-
rize initiatives, early experimentation with the device was surprisingly
sparse. It occurred principally in Oregon, 26 where the test cases sustain-
ing the constitutionality of initiatives and referenda were also gener-
ated. 27 While most states have used these devices sparingly, 28 California,
Oregon, and Washington have utilized them extensively, 29 thereby pro-
viding most of the empirical data for the analysis which follows.
B. Contemporary Practice
The past several years have witnessed increasing exploration of the
potential of direct legislation processes. 30 This "resurgence of the popu-
Any group of persons, from the cave of Adullam, or other groups of persons of ill-arranged
intellects, can propose initiative measures or call the referendum; and there is danger always
that the crudest measures may pass into law through the inattention of the voters, or that proper
legislative measures may be turned down through the referendum. The situation is the crank's
paradise.
The Oregonian, March 10, 1908, quoted in id. at 505.
25. Sixteen states had adopted the initiative by 1912, 123 CONG. REC. S 11,582 (daily ed. July
11, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Abourezk), when direct democracy advocate Theodore Roosevelt polled
27% as the presidential candidate of the Progressive Party. J. GRIMOND & B. NEVE, supra note 9, at
61-62. Thereafter the movement subsided, with only seven additional states adopting either the stat-
utory or the constitutional initiative process between 1913 and the present. 123 CONG. REc., supra at
S 11,582-83.
26. C. LOBINGIER, supra note 18, at 365. In five general elections (1904-1912) Oregon voters
adopted via initiative a direct primary law, a local option law, a corrupt practices act, proportional
representation, and women's suffrage. Id. at 362; note 22 supra. See generally J. BARNMrT, supra
note 21; E. OBERHOL=ZR, supra note 14, at 397-412. By contrast, in South Dakota, the vanguard of
the movement, the newly authorized initiative procedure remained dormant for a decade. Id. at 393.
27. In Kadderly v. City of Portland, 44 Or. 118, 74 P. 710, 719 (1903), the Oregon Supreme
Court held the initiative and referendum devices not inconsistent with the republican government
guarantee, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. A similar challenge was dismissed as nonjusticiable by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). See also notes
100-11 and accompanying text infra; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962).
28. Massachusetts, for example, has experienced only 26 proposed statutes, 2 proposed consti-
tutional amendments, and 12 referenda during the 60 years from 1918 through 1977. Stewart, The
Law ofInitiative Referendum in Massachusetts, 12 NEw ENGLAND L. REv. 455, 455 (1977).
29. H. BoNE, supra note 1, at 8. Washington citizens, for example, voted on 78 statutory initia-
tives and 61 referenda between 1914 and 1973. Id. at 52. For discussion of the experiences of Cali-
fornia, Oregon, and Washington, see L. TALLIAN, supra note 10, at 172-210 (initiatives on the
California ballot, 1912-1976); R. Benedict, supra note 20, at 373-86 (Washington initiatives and
referenda, 1914-1973). See generally Price, supra note 1, at 247-52. The initiative passage rates
have been 28% in California, 30% in Oregon, and 48% in Washington. R. Benedict, supra at
250-51.
30. See, e.g., Ledbetter, More and More, Voters Write Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1977, § A,
at 1, col. 4 (quoting W. Boyd of the National Municipal League); Bone & Benedict, Perspectives on
Direct Legislation: Washington State's Experience 1914-1973, 28 W. POL. Q. 330, 338 (1975).
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list style" 31 has been attributed to citizen frustration with taxation,3 2 and
to a decline in issue formulation by political parties, combined with
heightened activism by special interest organizations and enhanced ac-
cess to the media on public issues. 33 In this context, the highly publicized
passage of California's property tax-limiting Proposition 13 in June 1978
brought initiatives to the forefront of the national consciousness. 34 In the
November 1978 elections, the proliferation of ballot proposals reached a
thirty-year high for an off-year election, numbering 350 in thirty-seven
states and including forty statewide initiatives. 35
Complementing the trend toward increased use of the initiative are at-
tempts to provide for its authorization in the legislatures of many states
whose constitutions do not yet provide for the device. 36 Furthermore, a
federal constitutional amendment authorizing a national direct voter ini-
tiative, similar to that proposed in 1977 by Senators Abourezk and
Hatfield, 37 has attracted forty-nine congressional cosponsors, 38 as well as
31. Ledbetter, supra note 30. One California bureaucrat, disputing the characterization of initia-
tive proliferation as "populist," claimed that he could put any issue on the California ballot for
$325,000. Id.
32. Herbers, Deciding by Referendum is a Popular Proposition, N.Y. Times. Nov. 12, 1978, §
4, at 4, col. 4.
33. Stewart, supra note 28, at 455.
34. In November 1978, restraints on taxation or spending were passed in 13 states. Herbers.
supra note 32.
35. Id. In 80 years of state initiative use, approximately 1,200 issues, or an average of 15 per
year, have been submitted to voters. Initiative America, Questions and Answers About National
Voter Initiative (pamphlet on file with Washington Law Review).
36. Peirce, 'Tolerable Compromise' on Initiatives, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Feb. 9, 1979. § B.
at 3, col. 1.
37. S.J. Res. 67, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S 11,494 (daily ed. July I1, 1977). The
text of the proposed amendment provides as follows:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Con-
gress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein). That the following article is
proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all
intents and purposes as part of the Constitution if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of
the several States:
'ARTICLE
"SEctION 1. The People of the United States shall have the power to propose and enact laws
in accordance with this article, except with respect to carrying out the powers granted to Con-
gress in clauses eleven and fifteen of article I, section eight of this Constitution. This article
does not grant the people of the United States the power to propose amendments to this Consti-
tution.
"SECnoN 2. A law is proposed by presenting to the chief law enforcement officer of the
United States a petition that sets forth the text of the proposed law and contains signatures, col-
lected within the eighteen months prior to such presentation, of registered voters equal in num-
ber to three percent of the ballots cast in the last general election for President and which in-
cludes the signatures of registered voters in each of ten States equal in number to three percent
of the ballots cast in the last general election for President in each of the ten states. Within
ninety days of such presentation, the chief law enforcement officer of the United States shall
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extensive organizational3 9 and popular 40 support.
The proliferation of issue balloting described above, together with the
objectives sought by many of the proposals, places minority rights and
individual liberties in serious jeopardy. While the original advocates of
American direct democracy may have emphasized progressive govern-
mental reforms, 41 such applications are less common in modem practice
than are measures by which civil rights, and personal lifestyle and moral
choices, are threatened by an amorphous, anonymous majority. 42 In the
determine the validity of the signatures contained in such petition through consultation with the
appropriate States. Upon determination that such petition contains the required number of valid
signatures, he shall certify such petition. He shall then direct that the proposed law be placed on
the ballot at the next general election held for choosing Members of the House of Representa-
tives occurring at least one-hundred and twenty days after such certification. The Congress shall
provide by law reasonable procedures for the preparation and transmittal of such petitions, and
for the certification of signatures on such petitions. For the purposes of this section, the term
'State' shall include the District of Columbia.
"SEcIoN 3. A proposed law shall be enacted upon approval by a majority of the people cast-
ing votes with respect to such proposed law and shall take effect thirty days after such approval
except as otherwise provided in the proposed law. Any law enacted pursuant to this article shall
be a law the same as any other law of the United States, except that any law to repeal or amend
a law enacted pursuant to this article during the two years immediately following its effective
date must receive an affirmative roll-call vote of two-thirds of the members of each House duly
elected and sworn. No law, the enactment of which is forbidden the Congress by this Constitu-
tion or any amendment thereof, may be enacted by the people under this article.
"SECnON 4. The Congress and the people shall have the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."
123 Co u. REc. S11,584 (daily ed. July 11, 1977) (emphasis in original). A similar resolution was
introduced in the House of Representatives, H.R.J. Res. 658, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc.
H12,305 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1977). The case for a national initiative was also argued in the Progres-
sive era. See, e.g., D. WiLcox, supra note 7, at 305-12.
38. Herbers, supra note 32.
39. The campaign in Congress is being monitored by Initiative America, 606 Third Avenue,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001. See generally PEOPLE'S LOBBY, supra note 1.
40. A survey by the Gallup Organization found that 57% of those surveyed favored a national
initiative, 21% opposed it, and 22% were undecided. Initiative America, supra note 35.
41. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
42. Significant governmental reforms, such as California's open government initiative, echo the
historical imperative behind initiative use. See generally PEOPLE'S LOBBY, PROPOSITION 9: THE POLTI-
CAL REr om ACT (1974). However, such measures are comparatively infrequent in modem practice.
Bell, supra note 17, at 18.
In Washington, issues of morality and lifestyle have constituted 24.4% of initiatives certified to
the ballot, whereas governmental reforms have comprised only 19.2%. Bone & Benedict, supra note
30, at 334. In 1978 Californians were urged to increase the availability of the death penalty and to
abridge the rights of homosexuals and smokers, see SECRETARY OF STATE, 1978 CALIFORNIA VOTERS
PAMPHLEr 24-25, 41-46, and Washington voters were asked to prohibit busing for racial integration,
see Secretary of State, 1978 Voters and Candidates Pamphlet 4-6 (this measure was enacted by
overwhelming popular vote but subsequently was held unconstitutional in Seattle School Dist. v.
Washington, No. C78-753V (W.D. Wash. June 15, 1979) (mer.), appeal docketed, No. 79-4679
(9th Cir. Sept. 19, 1979), discussed in note 122 infra); The New Issues, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 2, 1978, at
56. In 1977 Washington voters enacted a stringent prohibition on pornography which has since been
declared unconstitutional. Spokane Arcades, Inc. v. Ray, 449 F. Supp. 1145 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
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Sixties efforts to repeal fair housing laws reached epidemic propor-
tions. 43 In the Seventies desegregative busing44 and antidiscrimination
ordinances protecting homosexuals have fallen prey to this "tyranny of
the majority." ' 45 Even facially neutral measures such as California's
Proposition 1346 may adversely affect the poor by curtailing government
services on which the poor, and hence minorities, are disproportionately
dependent. 47 In addition to discrimination against minorities, the list of
personal liberties sought to be regulated or constrained by initiative is
both voluminous and alarming. 48
The problem has been characterized as follows:
Direct democracy not only promoted the expression of the majority will on general political
legislation, but also permitted oppression of minorities and the imposition of a particular set of
social or moral values. The history of direct democracy is permeated with this tension between
effecting the will of the majority and protecting the rights of the minority.
Note, supra note 1I, at 106 (footnote omitted).
43. The developments of the Sixties have precedents in pioneer America. For example, in 1857
voters in the Oregon Territory overwhelmingly approved a law intended to exclude all free blacks.
E. BERWANGER, THE FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY: WESTERN ANTI-NEGRO PREJUDICE AND THE SLAVERY Ex-
TENSION CONTROVERSY 85-93 (1967). In 1912 the threat to racial minorities allegedly posed by initia-
tives was dismissed with the facile assurance that racial prejudice would soon disappear. D. WILCOX.
supra note 7, at 67. In 1963-68, in 10 cities and the State of California open housing referenda were
sponsored by opponents of open housing, including rightwing groups such as the John Birch Soci-
ety. J. GRIMOND & B. NEVE, supra note 9, at 63; Hamilton, Direct Legislation: Some Inplications of
Open Housing Referenda, 64 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 124, 125 (1970). In Reitman v. Mulkey. 387 U.S.
369 (1967), the California measure (Proposition 14; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26). which passed by a
vote of 4,526,460 to 2,396,747, was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, although the Court
carefully pointed out that mere repeal of open housing legislation did not violate the fourteenth
amendment. 387 U.S. at 376. See notes 149-154 and accompanying text infra; Seeley, The Public
Referendum and Minority Group Legislation: Postscript to Reitman v. Mulkey. 55 CORNELL L. REV.
881, 883-84 (1970). The Reitman decision may be cold comfort to discrimination victims other than
racial minorities; Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. asserts that if Proposition 14 had been directed at
age or sex discrimination its constitutional validity would have been upheld. Black. The Supreme
Court, 1966 Term-Foreword; "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14.
81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 82 (1967).
44. See note 42 supra.
45. See generally Williams, Turning the Tide on Gay Rights, SATURDAY REVIEW. Feb. 17. 1979.
at 21; Lichtenstein, Laws Aiding Homosexuals Face Rising Opposition Around the Nation. N.Y.
Times, April 27, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 3.
The most homophobic initiative appeared in California in November 1978 as Proposition 6. spon-
sored by State Senator John Briggs. Had it been enacted, any public school teacher, teacher's aide.
administrator or counselor would have been subject to dismissal for "advocating, soliciting, impos-
ing, encouraging or promoting of private or public homosexual activity directed at, or likely to come
to the attention of, schoolchildren and/or other employees ...." SECRETARY OF STATE. 1978 CALIFOR-
NIA VOTERS PAMPHLET 29 (text of proposed statute, § 3(b)(2)).
46. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § A. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
47. "Voters can cut taxes, as they did in California, Nevada, Idaho and other states, without
bearing the responsibility of also deciding which services are to be cut." Herbers, supra note 32. In a
poll of Californians conducted after the passage of Proposition 13 the respondents selected welfare
and day care as the public services most preferred for cutbacks. Education Commission of the States.
Public Opinion and Proposition 13 (1979).
48. See, e.g., note 42 supra.
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Compounding this threat is the lack of procedural safeguards govern-
ing initiative and referendum use. Ballot certification can easily be ob-
tained by a well-financed interest group. 49 "Tumultuous, media-ori-
ented" 50 campaigns often replace legislative hearings and debate,
reducing sensitive, complex political questions to simplistic moral judg-
ments5' and depriving a reviewing court of a coherent legislative his-
tory. 52 Once enacted, a ballot proposition may be more difficult to amend
or repeal than a legislative enactment, either because of statutory re-
straints53 or because of legislators' pragmatic reluctance to defy the vox
populi. While this lack of procedural safeguards facilitates enactments
hostile to minorities and individual liberties, the victim seeking judicial
redress is likely to encounter judicial deference, 54 or paralysis, 55 in deal-
ing with direct legislation. An appropriate judicial response, 56 based on
American constitutional and political history, 57 is the focus of the analy-
sis which follows.
49. See note 31 supra.
50. Bell, supra note 17, at 18-19 (describing the campaign surrounding the passage of Wash-
ington's antipornography initiative).
51. Fairlie, Taking Issue with the Initiative Process, L.A. Times, Nov. 14, 1978, pt. II, at 7,
col. 4. Morals issues elicit greater voter turnout than any other type of proposition. H. BONE, supra
note 1, at 11. While politicians in the legislature may be moderated by their accountability to
various constituencies, in direct legislation no political factors counsel restraint on voters' anony-
mous expression of irrational fears and prejudices. Bell, supra note 17, at 14-15. See note 93 and
accompanying text infra.
52. In evaluating the constitutionality of the initiative measure at issue in Reitman, the Court
examined .the" 'historical context and conditions existing prior to ... enactment,' " as well as the
objective and effect of the measure. 387 U.S. at 373. Courts will also look to published arguments,
such as those in the voters' pamphlet, to construe voters' intent in adopting an initiative or referen-
dum. Port of Longview v. taxpayers, 85 Wn. 2d 216, 533 P.2d 128 (1975).
53. For example, WASH. CoNsr. art. II, § 41 forbids legislative amendment or repeal of a popu-
lar enactment within two years unless a two-thirds majority of each house is obtained. Thus "the
legislative power of the people is superior to that of the legislature itself .... Trautman, Initiative
and Referendum in Washington: A Survey, 49 WASH. L. REv. 55, 66 (1973).
54. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1976)
(Burger, C.J.); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (Black, J.). See notes 123-26, 142-45
& 162-64 and accompanying text infra.
55. In the early years of this century, the constitutions of Colorado and Nevada, and perhaps of
other states, prohibited judicial invalidation of direct legislation. See J. BARNETT, supra note 21, at
174-75. The Colorado Constitution also provided that trial courts lacked jurisdiction to pass on con-
stitutional questions, see People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100, 198 P. 150 (1921) (provision found uncon-
stitutional), and that decisions of the state supreme court on constitutional questions could be re-
viewed by popular vote, see People v. Western Union Tel. Co., 70 Colo. 90, 193 P. 146 (1921)
(provision found unconstitutional).
56. See Part IV infra.
57. See Part II infra.
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II. DIRECT DEMOCRACY AS A POLITICAL PROCESS
A. The Founders' Aversion to Direct Democracy
Concern that direct democracy poses inherent dangers to individual
rights and liberties is not of recent origin.58 The same concern was
voiced in the critical period prior to the adoption of the federal constitu-
tion,59 and was one of the central themes repeatedly expressed in the de-
bates in the Federal Convention of 1787.60 Significantly, this concern
contributed to the selection of a system of representative government. 61
Initiatives, because they circumvent legislation by representative assem-
bly, embody the dangers of direct democracy recognized two centuries
ago. 6
2
58. "The concern that democratic government will provide inadequate protection for minorities
is as old as the nation-perhaps as old as the idea of democracy itself." Sandalow, Judicial
Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1164 (1977).
The historical analysis presented here is not intended to prove that because direct democracy has
been criticized in the past it is necessarily an evil to be scorned today. However, in Part IV this
comment will contend that the political process by which legislation is enacted has constitutional
significance and that the characteristics of the initiative process call for heightened judicial scrutiny
under the fourteenth amendment. This part explores the differences between legislation by represen-
tative assembly and legislation by popular vote. The views expressed in the 18th century, preceding
the adoption of the federal constitution, are particularly helpful in illustrating the fundamental differ-
ences between the two processes. At that time, Americans most carefully scrutinized the nature of
government, recognizing that they possessed the unique "opportunity of making an election of gov-
ernment." B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 272 (1967) (quoting
John Adams). "[The founding fathers] were closer than we to those basic structural arrangements by
which individual rights in a free society must be protected against the tyranny of the majority." Bell,
supra note 17, at 29. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976) ("Our inquiry of necessity
touches upon the fundamental principles of the Government established by the Framers of the Con-
stitution .... ").
59. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OFTHE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 409-13 (1969). Histori-
ans have labeled the 1780's the 'critical period' of the American Revolution:
The belief that the 1780's, the years after the peace with Britain, had become the really critical
period of the entire Revolution was prevalent everywhere during the decade .... The evidence
is overwhelming from every source-newspapers, sermons, and correspondence-that in the
minds of many Americans the course of the Revolution had arrived at a crucial juncture.
Id. at 393-94.
60. See generally I THE RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). For
examples, see note 67 and accompanying text infra.
61. A representative government differed from a pure democracy in "the delegation of the gov-
ernment ... to a small number of citizens elected by the rest." THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison),
at 59 (Bicentennial ed. 1976).
62. Of course, recognition of the dangers of direct democracy was not novel in the 18th century.
In seeking to understand the nature of government and politics and in fashioning a system of
government, Americans relied heavily on the lessons of history. G. WOOD, supra note 59, at 3-10.
The broad scope of their inquiry was indicated by John Adams' directive:
Let us study the law of nature; search into the spirit of the British constitution; read the histories
of ancient ages; contemplate the great examples of Greece and Rome; set before us the conduct
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In the 1780's the success of the American revolution was open to seri-
ous question.63 While the revolution had thrown off the tyranny of the
British monarchy, "[a]n excess of power in the people was leading...
to a new kind of tyranny, not by the traditional rulers, but by the people
themselves-what John Adams in 1776 had called a theoretical contra-
diction, a democratic despotism. "64 By 1788 James Madison concluded
that rather than the oppression of the majority by a minority, "[i]t is
much more to be dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to
the many." 65
Both the Federalist Papers and the records of the Federal Convention
of 1787 suggest that the federal constitution was designed to fashion a
of our own British ancestors, who have defended for us the inherent rights of mankind against
foreign and domestic tyrants and usurpers ....
3 J. ADAMS, THE WORKS OFJOHN ADAMS 462 (1851). Alexander Hamilton's conclusions were typical:
It has been observed, by an honorable gentleman, that a pure democracy, if it were practicable,
would be the most perfect government. Experience has proved that no position in politics is
more false than this. The ancient democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated,
never possessed one feature of good government. Their very character was tyranny; their fig-
ure, deformity.
2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS 253 (1866). See Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4 Harr.)
479, 485 (1857) ("[The founders] had been taught by the lessons of history, that equal and indeed
greater dangers resulted from a pure democracy, than from an absolute monarchy. Each leads to des-
potism.").
63. G. WOOD, supra note 59, at 393-429.
64. Id. at 404. Adams' statement in 1776 was consistent with the contemporary Whig theory of
government, which posited "a perpetual battle between the passions of the rulers ... and the united
interest of the people." Id. at 18. The people were presumed to be a homogeneous entity, and thus it
was possible to equate public liberty (the ability of the people to participate in government) with
private liberty (protection of the individual from oppressive government). See Buel, Democracy and
the American Revolution: A Frame of Reference, 21 WI. & MARY Q. 165 (3d ser. 1964).
This equation was no longer possible once the reality of popular government had been experi-
enced. In the debates in the Connecticut convention on the adoption of the federal constitution,
Governor Huntingdon explained:
The great secret of preserving liberty is, to lodge the supreme power so as to be well sup-
ported, and not abused. If this could be effected, no nation would ever lose its liberty. The
history of man clearly shows that it is dangerous to intrust the supreme power in the hands of
one man. The same source of knowledge proves that it is not only inconvenient, but dangerous
to liberty, for the people of a large community to attempt to exercise in person the supreme
authority. Hence arises the necessity that the people should act by their representatives ....
2 J. ELuOT, supra note 62, at 198. See G. WOOD, supra note 59, at 606-07; Ely, Toward a Repre-
sentation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REv. 451, 456-61 (1978).
65. Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), 14 JEFERsoN PAPERS 20(Q. Boyd ed. 1945),
quoted in G. WOOD, supra note 59, at 413. Madison elaborated on this theme on anotheroccasion:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In our Gov-
ernments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private
rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its
constituents, but from acts in which the Government is'the mere instrument of the major num-
ber of the Constituents.
5 WrIrINGs OF JNIas MADISON 272 (G. Hunt ed. 1904) (emphasis in original).
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political system which could prevent a tyranny of the majority as well as
a tyranny of the few. 66
The members most tenacious of republicanism, he [Alexander Hamilton]
observed, were as loud as any in declaiming agst. the vices of democracy
.... Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power
to the few they will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have power.
that each may defend itself against agst. the other.67
No attempt is made here to explore fully the panoply of political devices
employed to strike the desired balance;68 unquestionably, however, rep-
resentation was a central and pervasive element 69 of the balanced govern-
66. See C. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 93 (1912). The fundamental ten-
sion inherent in the American political system between majority rule and limitations on majority
power was observed by Tocqueville. I A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 269 (1945).
Tocqueville also perceived the greater danger of popular government to be majority tyranny rather
than weakness resulting from the absence of a strong central authority. Id. at 270-71, 279.
67. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 288. A variety of proposals were
offered to cure the evils perceived, see note 68 infra, but the delegates agreed that the excesses of
democracy were the source of the nation's troubles. For example:
Mr. Gerry. The evils which we experience flow from the excess of democracy .... In Massts.
it has been fully confirmed by experience that they [the people] are daily misled into the most
baneful measures and opinions by the false reports circulated by designing men, and which no
one on the spot can refute.
•.. [Mr. Randolph] observed that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under
which the U.S. laboured; that in tracing these evils to their origin every man had found it in the
turbulence and follies of democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for agst. this
tendency of our Governments: and that a good Senate seemed most likely to answer the pur-
pose.
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 48, 51.
68. Many such devices concerned the structure of representative government: a bicameral legis-
lature, executive veto power, other separation of powers, limited terms of office for representatives,
and so forth. See G. WOOD, supra note 59, at 430-68, 519-62.
69. Id. at 596-600. See Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of East-
lake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1412 n. 162 (1978).
As a device to filter the desires of the majority, representative government was reconciled with the
theory of popular government through the institution of the constitutional convention.
There were two levels of law, a higher law or constitution that only the people could make or
amend, through constitutional conventions or bodies similarly empowered; and a statutory law.
to be made and unmade, within the assigned limits, by legislators to whom the constitution gave
this function.
1 R. PALMER, THE AGE OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE AND AMERICA.
1760-1800, at 215 (1959). See G. WOOD, supra note 59, at 306-43.
The notion that once the people participate in setting the structure of government they retire from
direct participation therein was articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such princi-
ples as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness is the basis on which the
whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exer-
tion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so estab-
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ment designed by the founding fathers. Perhaps the most eloquent state-
ments of the theory that a representative assembly is a political tool to
check abuse of the minority by the majority were authored by James
Madison. In The Federalist No. 10, Madison explored the evils of fac-
tions to which he attributed the "distresses under which we labor.''70
The problem presented was to devise a governmental structure that could
reconcile popular government with the threat to individual liberties posed
by a faction which is able to gain majority support:
When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government,
on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both
the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good
and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time
to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great
object to which our inquiries are directed. 71
Madison was convinced that a pure democracy "can admit of no cure for
the mischiefs of faction.'"72 The solution was to be found, rather, in a
republic: "a government in which the scheme of representation takes
place." 73
lished, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and
can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
2 U.S. (1 Cranch) 60, 73 (1803).
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison), supra note 61, at 54. Of course, a scheme of
representation alone is not enough to safeguard minority rights. See Ely, supra note 64, at 461. One
response to the dangers of democracy following the Revolution was an increased role for the judici-
ary. See G. WOOD, supra note 59, at 453-63. The power of the judiciary to review the constitution-
ality of laws enacted by the legislature, see Marbury v. Madison, 2 U.S. (I Cranch) 60 (1803), gave
the courts a central role in checking the dangers of majority rule. "[T]he power vested in the Ameri-
can courts of justice of pronouncing a statute to be unconstitutional forms one of the most powerful
barriers that have ever been devised against the tyranny of political assemblies." 1 A. DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 66, at 107.
71. THE FFDERALiST No. 10 (J. Madison), supra note 61, at 57-58. It is difficult to overestimate
the importance which Madison attached to the task of devising a governmental structure which de-
rived its authority from the people but was able to protect the rights of individuals. Fulfillment of
that objective was "the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the
opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of
mankind." Id. at 58.
72. Id. Initiatives would provide a faction which gains majority support an opportunity to enact
oppressive legislation, an opportunity Madison perceived and sought to prevent:
The lesson we are to draw from the whole is that where a majority are united by a common
sentiment and have an opportunity, the rights of the minor party become insecure .... It was
incumbent on us then to try this remedy, and with that view to frame a republican system on
such a scale & in such a form as will controul all the evils wch. have been experienced.
I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONvENTION, supra note 60, at 136 (footnote omitted).
73. THE FEDERAUST No. 10 (J. Madison), supra note 61, at 59. Whether, as a matter of
definition, representation is a necessary element of a republic has been the subject of some judicial
debate. See Part III-A infra; Seeley, supra note 43, at 905-10 & n.96; Bonfield, The Guarantee
Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 558-60
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Representative government safeguards minority rights in two impor-
tant ways. First, representatives act as a filter through which the views of
individuals or factions flow prior to being enacted into law. In Madison's
words, the function of representative government is "to refine and en-
large the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen
body of citizens." 74 The framers believed that in contrast to direct de-
mocracy, the quality of elected representatives and the processes of
debate and compromise integral to representative government would di-
minish the likelihood of an oppressive majority imposing its will on a mi-
nority. 75
Second, representative government protects minority rights because,
under the theory of government developed by the founders, representa-
tives have a duty to govern on behalf of all the people, including those in
a minority.
The "republic" [the founders] sought to create was not one in which the
government pursued the interests of a priviledged few or even only the in-
terests of those groups that could work themselves into some majority coali-
tion, but rather one in which the majority would govern in the interest of the
whole people.76
Whereas direct democracy would allow a majority to govern exclusively
in its own interest, representative government provides for consideration
of all interests in the legislative process.
The Founding Fathers thus eschewed direct democracy in selecting a
form of government. Speaking at the Constitutional Convention, Alexan-
der Hamilton proclaimed: "We are now forming a republican govern-
(1962). In any case, it is clear that representative government was seen as critical to alleviation of the
dangers of democracy. "In truth, said Madison, representation was 'the pivot' on which the whole
American system moved." G. WooD, supra note 59, at 597.
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison), supra note 61, at 59.
75. Public debate on an initiative can clarify the proposal's impact on minority groups. but can-
not lead to compromise or political tradeoffs which are possible in a legislative assembly. See notes
91-93 and accompanying text infra.
76. Ely, supra note 64, at 458 (emphasis in original). The duty of a representative to represent
minorities has been explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in other contexts as a means of pre-
venting a tyranny of the majority. In Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Orga-
nization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975), the Court noted that national labor policy
'extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own relations with his employerand
creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees ....
In vesting the representatives of the majority with this broad power Congress did not, of
course, authorize a tyranny of the majority over minority interests. ... [B]y the very nature of
the exclusive bargaining representative's status as representative of all unit employees, Con-
gress implicitly imposed upon it a duty fairly and in good faith to represent the interests of mi-
norities within the unit.
Id. at 63-64 (emphasis in original). See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944);
note 171 and accompanying text infra.
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ment. Real liberty is neither found in despotism or the extremes of
democracy, but in moderate goverments.", 77
B. Contemporary Political Theory
The framers' opposition to direct democracy is not outmoded today.
On balance, the arguments advanced by contemporary political scientists
for and against popular legislation may undercut the historical aversion to
any exercise of direct democracy, but at the same time confirm the need
for an effective restraint on its use.
The current debate over the use of initiatives can be organized in terms
of the two fundamental and conflicting values with which the framers
struggled: government by the people (majority rule) versus protection of
individual rights and minority interests. 78
Proponents of the initiative emphasize the former value and contend
that a direct vote of the people on legislative proposals promotes that
value. 79 They argue, inter alia, that direct legislation avoids flaws in rep-
resentative government, increases voter involvement in the political pro-
cess, 80 and is a purer expression of the will of the people than is legisla-
tion by representative assembly.81 Central to these arguments is "an
emphasis on 'the people' and their role in decision-making;" 82 initiatives
and referenda permit the people to exercise their sovereignty in a legisla-
tive manner, and help effectuate majority rule. 83 One advocate ex-
plained:
77. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 432.
78. See note 66 and accompanying text supra; Note, supra note 11, at 106.
79. A clear statement of this view was penned by Justice Black: "Provisions for referendums
demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice." James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
80. Although it may be impossible to measure, citizen education is one of the most important
benefits to be derived from the initiative process. See H. BONE, supra note 1, at 7; Bone & Benedict,
supra note 30, at 349.
81. Note, supra note 1, at 938-40. See H. BONE, supra note 1; Bone & Benedict, supra note 30,
at 331-32. The last argument encompasses two contentions. First, by avoiding the mediating, and
potentially antimajoritarian role of a legislative assembly, direct action by the electorate provides a
clearer expression of the will of a majority of the people. Second, a clearer expression of the popular
will is afforded by focusing on issues rather than personalities, as is more likely the case when repre-
sentatives are elected. Id. at 331-32. In both respects, popular democracy is seen as providing a
check on the legislature when it deviates from the will of the majority.
82. H. BONE, supra note 1, at 5. See Bone & Benedict, supra note 30, at 28; notes 20-22 and
accompanying text supra.
83. mhe theory went that by denying the right of persons to initiative laws, an inherent con-
tradiction arises. Our government rests upon the premise that all sovereignty rests in the people.
In turn, the people delegate certain powers to the government. If a sovereign can grant a power,
then it most certainly has the right to exercise that power.
H. BONE, supra note 1, at 5. The theory overlooks a central aspect of American government dis-
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[T]he initiative, the referendum, and the recall are closely connected parts
of the same political theory. The people elect their representatives. If those
representatives do not carry out the will of the people, then the people initi-
ate legislation. If their representatives transgress the will of the people, then
the people, through the referendum, repeal the laws which their
representatives have made. 84
Opponents of increased use of direct democracy contest both the asser-
tion that the initiative is a better means of effectuating majoritarian de-
sires, and the value judgment which elevates majority rule above protec-
tion of individual liberty. 85 On the basis of statistics compiled by political
scientists, it is argued that low voter turnout, 86 lack of voter knowledge
of the issues posed, 87 and a tendency of voters not to consider underlying
policy questions 88 all weaken the claim that the initiative better
effectuates majority rule than does legislation by representative assem-
bly.89 Moreover, opponents argue that "substantial distortions of public
choice may arise from putting some questions to a direct vote of the peo-
ple" 90 because of the absence of legislative deliberation and compromise
and the necessity of making a yes or no choice on complex issues. 9 1
closed in the records of the Constitutional Convention-once the people create the machinery of
government, they let their theoretical sovereignty lapse, except to the extent necessary to alter the
machinery. See note 69 supra.
84. 47 CoNo. REC. app. 63, at 67 (1911) (speech of Rep. John E. Raker).
85. H. BONE, supra note I, at 6-7. See Note, supra note 1, at 940-42.
86. Hamilton, supra note 43, at 128. "Low [voter] participation rates not only are at variance
with the premise of direct democracy that the people wish to be legislators, but also vitiate somewhat
its claim to be a more authentic expression of the 'general will' than the representative body whose
decision is being challenged." Id.
87. Id. at 133. The Washington State Supreme Court has stated that it "can safely assume that
not all voters will read the text of the initiative or the explanatory statement." In re Ballot Title for
Initiative 333, 88 Wn. 2d 192, 198, 558 P.2d 248, 252 (1977).
88. Hamilton, supra note 43, at 131.
89. Wolfinger & Greenstein, The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referen-
dum Voting, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 753 (1968).
Among contemporary political scientists it is more common to assume that asking voters to pass
judgment on substantive policy questions strains their information and interest, leading them to
decisions that may be inconsistent with their own desires. The consequence is subversion of
representative government and the exercise of undue influence by groups that can afford to
gather the signatures to qualify a measure for the referendum ballot and then wage a publicity
campaign that will have an impact on the voters.
Id. at 767 (footnotes omitted).
90. Andersen, A Washington Income Tax Without Constitutional Amendment, 6 WASH. PUB.
POL'Y NoTES No. 2 (1978).
91. Id. The defects of the initiative process may be more significant in regard to certain issues:
Issues which appeal to narrower, pocketbook interests of the voters, issues which are easily
oversimplified, issues easily distorted in publicity campaigns, issues which are parts of a set of
complex interrelationships difficult to respond to with yes or no answers, issues which can be
cast by advocates in inflammatory or emotional terms, issues on which stable majority and mi-
190
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Opposition to initiatives also stems from the potential abuse of minor-
ity rights. 92 Political scientists have noted that legislation by popular vote
increases the majority's ability to override minority interests, observing
that direct democracy is not responsive to the intensity of a particular
viewpoint in the community. While a legislative assembly may be
swayed by strong views held by a minority on a particular issue, the in-
tensity of the views held by one group or one individual is not reflected
in the one-person one-vote initiative process. 93 As a result, a minority
group has less influence on the outcome of an initiative than on the suc-
cess of a bill in the legislature.
The failure of the initiative process adequately to consider minority
nority interests are opposed-all such issues pose special risks in public referenda and are argu-
ably more safely left to the cooler and more deliberative legislative process.
Id. The argument, however, can be made more generally:
We noted earlier one of the advantages of the legislative over the plebiscitory decision-mak-
ing process: the former not only permits but is characterized by compromises between the initial
demands of groups of varying size and intensity. In referenda, of course, compromise is
impossible once the issue has been formally posed.
Wolfinger & Greenstein, supra note 89, at 768. Professor Sager makes a similar point:
Legislation by plebiscite is not and cannot be a deliberate process. We expect and presumably
derive from an initiative or referendum an expression of the aggregate will of the majority, or
the majority of those who vote. But there is no genuine debate or discussion, no individual rec-
ord or accountability, no occasion for individual commitment to a consistent or fair course of
conduct.
Sager, supra note 69, at 1414-15 (footnote omitted).
92. For a thorough discussion of the use of direct democracy and its impact on racial minorities,
see Bell, supra note 17. Professor Bell argues that "the experience of blacks with the referendum has
proved ironically that the more direct democracy becomes, the more threatening it is." Id. at 1.
Racial minorities lose the protection afforded by representative assembly and suffer from different
voting patterns characteristic of initiatives and referenda. "Comparison of the voters and nonvoters
confirms that direct democracy also has distinct social bias. Because of low turnouts, local referenda
are likely to have more class bias than major elections." Hamilton, supra note 43, at 129.
93. Wolfinger & Greenstein, supra note 89, at 768-69. The authors, in comparing legislation
by popular vote with that by representative assembly, observe:
A second, closely related advantage of legislatures is that they typically take account of the in-
tensity of demands as well as their numerical support, while in referenda every voter's prefer-
ence, no matter how casual, is equally weighted. The legislative process is responsive to inten-
sity because legislators (consciously or unconsciously) ask themselves how much the interested
parties care about the issue since they want to find out what the cost in votes and other
campaign support will be of disappointing one side or the other.
While politicians inevitably are imperfect in their calculations about intensity, voters are un-
likely to make such judgments at all, particularly when their views are channeled through the
referendum process.
Id. See Bell, supra note 17, at 25; Kendall & Carey, The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic The-
ory, 62 AMi. POL. Sci. Rev. 5 (1968).
This analysis underscores one of the fundamental differences between representative government
and direct democracy which was observed by the founding fathers. The representative assembly pro-
vides an institutional setting for weighing competing interests of all the people, whereas the majority
need not, and apparently does not, consider minority viewpoints in the initiative process.
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viewpoints, coupled with the absence of those institutional safeguards for
individual rights and liberties which inhere in representative government,
suggests the need for some restraint upon the increasing use of this brand
of popular democracy. The extent to which the courts have provided and
are able to provide this restraint is the subject of the remaining sections.
III. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY-
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
Throughout its history, use of the initiative has been subject to legal
challenges. However, the courts, and particularly the United States Su-
preme Court, have been unable to arrive at an analytical framework
which provides adequate protection for threatened minority rights. This
section examines those cases which have challenged the initiative process
itself. In those cases it has been argued that the process is in all or at least
some instances unconstitutional. 94 Part IV examines judicial review of
laws enacted by initiative, and proposes a standard of review which
would provide an effective restraint on the potential abuse of direct de-
mocracy.
A. The Republican Guarantee Clause
In 1847 the Delaware legislature passed a local option law95 authoriz-
ing the citizens of each county to "decide by their votes whether or not
the retailing of intoxicating liquors shall be permitted in said counties.' '96
In Rice v. Foster,97 the Delaware Supreme Court held the law unconstitu-
tional. The court did not specifically rely on the republican guarantee
clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that "[the
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government. "98 However, the court made clear its belief that
direct democracy was not to be tolerated under either the federal or state
constitutions:
The nature and spirit of our republican form of government ... have estab-
94. Limitations as to when, and on what subjects, direct democracy may operate could be
provided by statute. For examples of such statutory limitations, see Note. Limitations on Initiative
and Referendum, 3 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1951). Additional limitations are discussed in Note. The
Proper Use of Referenda in Rezoning, 29 STAN. L. REv. 819, 845-50 (1977).
95. A local option law was an enactment by a state legislature which took effect in counties or
towns only after being approved by local voters. Note, supra note 11, at 107-09.
96. Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 479, 479 (1847).
97. Id.
98. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4.
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lished limits to the exercise of legislative power, beyond which it cannot
constitutionally pass ...
... Wherever the power of making laws, which is the supreme power in
a State, has been exercised directly by the people under any system of
polity, and not by representation, civil liberty has been overthrown. 99
The argument that direct democracy violates the republican guarantee
clause was presented to the United States Supreme Court in Pacific
States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon.l00 The company chal-
lenged a tax measure enacted through the initiative process, arguing that:
The initiative is in contravention of a republican form of government.
Government by the people directly is the attribute of a pure democracy and
is subversive of the principles upon which the Republic is founded. Direct
legislation is therefore repugnant to that form of government with which
alone Congress could admit a state to the Union, and which the state is
bound to maintain.101
The Court did not reach the merits of this argument, holding that the
issues raised were "in their very essence . . . political and governmen-
tal," and therefore nonjusticiable 1 02 Although the Court's reasoning has
been criticized, 10 3 its holding has endured. 0 4
99. Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) at 485-86. State courts did not reach uniform results in
reviewing local option laws. Compare, e.g., Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. 507 (1847) (holding
local option law invalid under Pennsylvania constitution) with Caldwell v. Barrett, 73 Ga. 604
(1884) (upholding constitutionality of local option laws).
100. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
101. Id. at 138.
102. Id. at 151.
103. The thrust of the criticism is that the Court overstated the challenge that was being made.
The Court asserted that:
[t]he propositions each and all proceed alone upon the theory that the adoption of the initiative
and referendum destroyed all government republican in form in Oregon. This being so, the con-
tention, if held to be sound, would necessarily affect the validity, not only of the particular stat-
ute which is before us, but of every other statute passed in Oregon since the adoption of the
initiative and referendum. And indeed, the propositions go further than this, since in their es-
sence they assert that there is no governmental function, legislative or judicial, in Oregon,
because it cannot be assumed, if the proposition be well founded, that there is, at one and the
same time, one and the same government, which is republican in form, and not of that charac-
ter.
Id. at 141. In fact, the telephone company was only challenging a particular statute; nonetheless, to
accept the argument that the statute was invalid because enacted by initiative would invalidate all
statutes so enacted. See Bonfield, supra note 73, at 555; Sager, supra note 69, at 1403-04; Seeley,
supra note 43, at 905-10.
104. See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Kiernan v. Portland, 223 U.S.
151 (1912). Although the Court, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964), held that the nonjusticiability of "republican form" questions is the result of the
Court's discretionary application of the political question doctrine, and not of constitutional compul-
sion, Pacific States' rejection of a direct challenge to the initiative as nonjusticiable has not been
impaired. See Bell, supra note 17, at 27 n.99.
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Since Rice v. Foster, state courts which have reached the merits of
whether direct democracy is inconsistent with a republican form of gov-
ernment generally have upheld the use of initiatives. 105 The issue arose in
Oregon nine years before the Supreme Court decided Pacific States. In
Kadderly v. City of Portland'0 6 the state supreme court held that "the ini-
tiative and referendum amendment [to the Oregon Constitution] does not
abolish or destroy the republican form of government, or substitute an-
other in its place."' 1 7 The Oklahoma Supreme Court cited Kadderly in
reaching the same conclusion five years later. 108
The courts thus rejected the republican guarantee clause as a doctrinal
device for preventing abuses of the initiative process. 10 9 In order to
uphold a direct "republican form" challenge to a statute enacted by the
people, a court would have had to invalidate the initiative process and all
laws enacted thereunder. Given that article IV, section 4, does not by its
terms compel such a result, 10 and particularly in light of the democratic
virtues of the initiative process,"' it is not surprising that the courts
avoided that result.
B. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
On several occasions the United States Supreme Court has found that
certain provisions for direct democracy violated the fourteenth amend-
ment. Although the doctrinal bases for striking down such provisions, if
expanded, had the potential to prevent abuses of direct democracy, they
shared the infirmity of the republican guarantee clause of leading to more
extensive prohibition of direct democracy than is necessary to curb po-
tential abuses. They have been limited in application by the Court for a
variety of reasons, including a general deference to the processes of di-
rect democracy.
105. See Note, Constitutionality of the Referendum, 41 YALE L.J. 133 (1931).
106. 44Or. 118, 74 P. 710(1903).
107. Id., 74 P. at 720.
108. Ex parte Wagner, 21 Okla. 33, 95 P. 435 (1908).
109. But see Seeley, supra note 43, at 909.
A system that subjects pro-minority group legislation already passed by representative govern-
ment to approval by absolute majority vote is similarly an obvious denial of a republican form
of government. It is not representative at all, and it subjects the minority to exactly the kind of
capriciousness that the guarantee clause was intended to prevent. Thus. the discrimination-
prone referendum should not be liable to political question objections for lack of an applicable
standard.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Despite the theoretical possibility of this limited use of article IV. section 4.
Professor Seeley himself thought it "unlikely that the Court will abandon its traditional view of the
guarantee clause." Id. at 910.
110. See Bonfield, supra note 73, at 558.
111. See notes 80-84 and accompanying text supra.
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In Hunter v. Erickson,112 the Supreme Court held that a provision of
the city charter of Akron, Ohio violated the equal protection clause of the
the fourteenth amendment. The provision prohibited "the city council
from implementing any ordinance dealing with racial, religious, or an-
cestral discrimination in housing without the approval of the majority of
voters of Akron."' 13 The Court's holding was premised on the explicit
racial classification drawn by the charter provision. By making popular
approval of ordinances aimed at eliminating racial discrimination in
housing mandatory, the provision "disadvantage[d] those who would
benefit from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations as
against those who would bar other discriminations or who would other-
wise regulate the real estate market in their favor.""14
Writing for the Court, Justice White stated:
[A]lthough the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an
identical manner, the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority.
The majority needs no protection against discrimination and if it did, a ref-
erendum might be bothersome but no more than that. Like the law requiring
specification of candidates' race on the ballot, [the charter provision] places
special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process. This
is no more permissible than denying them the vote, on an equal basis with
others. 115
This recognition in Hunter that a requirement of public approval of legis-
lation places special burdens on minorities suggested that the equal pro-
tection clause might offer protection whenever any legislation involving
minority group interests was subject to popular vote. 116
However, two factors severely limit the effect of Hunter. First,
Hunter's equal protection analysis was triggered because the provision
for mandatory referenda was applicable only to a particular class of legis-
lation.1 17 Typical, nonmandatory initiative and referendum provisions,
112. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
113. Id. at 386.
114. Id. at 391. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, spelled out the traditional equal protec-
tion analysis that was the basis for the holding:
Here, we have a provision that has the clear purpose of making it more difficult for certain ra-
cial and religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their interest. Since the charter
amendment is discriminatory on its face, Akron must bear a far heavier burden of justification
than is required in the normal case.
Id. at 395. See Seeley, supra note 43, at 893-96.
115. 393 U.S. at 391 (citations omitted).
116. See Seeley, supra note 43, at 895-96.
117. The court stated that
Even though Akron might have proceeded by majority vote at town meeting on all its municipal
legislation, it has instead chosen a more complex system. Having done so, the State may no
more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its
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which are invoked by petition regardless of the subject matter of the leg-
islation involved, 118 would not run afoul of Hunter, even though minor-
ity group interests may be adversely affected.
Second, the classification in the Akron ordinance was based on race, a
special concern of the fourteenth amendment. 119 When later presented
with a challenge to a state constitutional provision requiring mandatory
referenda prior to commencement of low rent public housing projects,
the Court in James v. Valtierral20 limited Hunter to referenda provisions
which rest on racial classifications. 121 Hunter thus affords judicial pro-
tection from mandatory referenda provisions aimed at legislation which
would prevent discrimination against racial, religious, or ethnic minori-
ties, but it does not afford protection from the customary nonmandatory
use of the initiative process. 122
The Court's decision in James is significant not only for its doctrinal
content, but also for what it indicates about the Court's attitude toward
direct democracy. In sustaining article XXXIV of the California State
Constitution, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, praised the refer-
endum process: "Provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to de-
mocracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice. . . . This procedure
for democratic decisionmaking does not violate the constitutional com-
behalf than it may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than an-
other of comparable size.
393 U.S. at 392-93 (citations omitted).
118. See note I supra.
119. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 394 (1873). More recently, the
Court has stated that "[tihe central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race." Washington v. Davis.
426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
120. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
121. Id. Justice Black, who had dissented in Hunter, wrote for the Court:
Unlike the Akron referendum provision, it cannot be said that California's Article XXXIV
rests on "distinctions based on race." [393 U.S.] at 391 .... The Article requires referendum
approval for any low-rent public housing project, not only for projects which will be occupied
by a racial minority. And the record here would not support any claim that a law seemingly
neutral on its face is in fact aimed at a racial minority. Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960). The present case could be affirmed only by extending Hunter, and this we decline
to do.
Id. at 141. See Bell, supra note 17, at 3-6. Cf. Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 449 F.2d
871, 878 (2d Cir. 1971) (sustaining statute providing financial assistance for purchase of textbooks
in grades seven through 12, but requiring voter approval of tax to pay for textbooks in grades one
through six; claim of unfair burden on parents of children in lower grades "clearly foreclosed" by
James).
122. The doctrinal content of Hunter was significant in a subsequent case involving an initia-
tive. In Seattle School Dist. v. Washington, No. C78-753V (W.D. Wash. June 15, 1979) (mem.),
appeal docketed, No. 79-4676 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 1979), the constitutionality of a school busing
initiative was at issue. The initiative adopted by the Washington voters prohibited the assignment of
school children beyond the next-nearest neighborhood school, except for certain purposes. Racial
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mand that no State shall deny to any person 'the equal protection of the
laws.' "123
Arguably, this praise was dictum, since Justice Black found doctrinal
support for his position in the lack of any explicit racial classification in
article XXXIV. 12 4 But in a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall
observed:
The Court, however, chooses to subject the article to no scrutiny what-
soever and treats the provision as if it contained a totally benign, technical
economic classification. . . Yet after observing that the article does not
discriminate on the basis of race, the Court's only response to the real ques-
tion in these cases is the unresponsive assertion that 'referendums demon-
strate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination or prejudice.' It is
far too late in the day to contend that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
only racial discrimination; and to me, singling out the poor to bear a burden
not placed on any other class of citizens tramples the values that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect.125
Thus, in addition to limiting the scope of Hunter, James stands as a state-
ment of the Court's deference to the processes of direct democracy. 126
C. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has also been a
device for judicial limitation of direct democracy. In Eubank v. City of
Richmond 27 and in Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Ro-
berge,128 the Supreme Court held that zoning ordinances which dele-
gated zoning decisions to property owners violated the due process
clause.
integration was not among the permissible purposes. Id. at 3-4. The court relied on Hunter in hold-
ing that by treating assignments for racial balancing differently than assignments for other purposes,
the initiative drew a racial classification prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 4.
123. 402 U.S. at 141, 143.
124. Id. at 141.
125. Id. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126. One district court has noted that referenda have been accorded special deference, and that
cases involving referenda therefore are not generally applicable:
[C]ases involving referendums, though helpful in terms of standing, jurisdiction, and judicial
attitudes towards discrimination in housing, are a category unto themselves. James v. Valtierra
... and Ranjel v. City of Lansing .... heavily relied on by defendant are thus not dispositive
of the issues. The voting rights involved in those cases inject quite a different constitutional
ingredient, one not present in pure zoning cases, and courts are quite understandably more
willing to uphold referendum procedures rather than second guess or interefere with the funda-
mental suffrage right.
Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396, 403 (N.D.
Ill. 1971) (mem.).
127. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
128. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
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The ordinance involved in Eubank permitted the owners of two-thirds
of the property abutting any street to set the building line beyond which
construction could not take place. The Court focused on due process con-
siderations in holding the ordinance unconstitutional:
The statute and ordinance, while conferring the power on some property
holders to virtually control and dispose of the property rights of others, cre-
ates no standard by which the power thus given is to be exercised: in other
words, the property holders who desire and have the authority to establish
the line may do so solely for their own interest, or even capriciously. 129
Similarly, in Roberge the Court held invalid a Seattle ordinance per-
mitting construction of a philanthropic home for the aged "when the writ-
ten consent shall have been obtained of the owners of two-thirds of the
property within four hundred (400) feet of the proposed building."' 30
Noting that the exercise of zoning power by the property owners was not
controlled by any standard and was not reviewable, the Court held that
the attempted delegation violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 131
Eubank and Roberge conceivably could protect minorities from abuses
of direct democracy by prohibiting the use of initiatives and referenda, as
deprivations of procedural due process, where the legislation involved
could impair property or liberty interests. 132 However, the Supreme
129. 226 U.S. at 144-45.
130. 278 U.S. at 118.
131. Id. at 123. In Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917). decided after
Eubank but before Roberge, the Court upheld an ordinance permitting the erection of billboards only
upon the approval of a majority of the affected property owners. The Roberge Court distinguished
Cusack, noting that there "[tihe facts found were sufficient to warrant the conclusion that such bill-
boards would or were liable to endanger the safety and decency of such districts." 278 U.S. at 122.
Because the ordinance in Cusack was seen as providing a means by which a legislative restriction
legitimately imposed could be rescinded by the people, it did not carry the due process implications
of the ordinances involved in Eubank and Roberge, which gave the eligible voters the power to arbi-
trarily impose a restriction on an individual's use of property. See Sager. supra note 69, at 1405-06.
132. This would require an expansion of current doctrine, since procedural due process
requirements extend only to adjudicative determinations, and not to legislative actions. Compare Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) with Londoner v. Denver. 210
U.S. 373 (1908). See Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1508 (1978). The
distinction has been preserved in its application to initiatives by the California Supreme Court. San
Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council. 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 520, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146
(1974) (initiative procedure can be used to adopt a zoning ordinance constituting a general legisla-
tive, as distinct from adjudicative, act).
Professor Sager, however, has advocated a "due process of lawmaking":
The claim for such a process requirement seems quite strong when two conditions are met: first.
where substantial constitutional values are placed in jeopardy by the enactment at issue: and
second, where substantive review of the enactment by the judiciary is largely unavailable and
hence cannot secure these constitutional values.
Vol. 55:175, 1979
Judicial Review of Initiatives
Court limited the effect of these cases in City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc., 133 where it held that exercise of the zoning power by
the people at large does not violate the due process clause.
The issue facing the Court in Eastlake was "whether a city charter pro-
vision requiring proposed land use changes to be ratified by 55% of the
votes cast violate[d] the due process rights of a landowner who applies
for a zoning change."' 134 The Ohio Supreme Court, relying on Eubank
and Roberge, held that the ordinance violated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 135
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 136 The Court noted that, to
be subject to Ohio's referendum procedure, zoning action must be legis-
lative in nature, and that the Supreme Court of Ohio had expressly found
the specific action being challenged to fit that definition. 137 This "legisla-
tive" characterization was apparently sufficient to enable the majority to
dismiss, without discussion, any claim that procedural due process
requirements should apply. 138 The Court instead focused on, and re-
jected, the argument that the referendum provision was a standardless
delegation of legislative power. Cases in which the delegation doctrine
was articulated 139 "involved a delegation of power by the legislature to
regulatory bodies, which are not directly responsible to the people; [the]
doctrine is inapplicable where, as here, rather than dealing with a delega-
Sager, supra note 69, at 1418. Professor Sager's proposal seems designed to meet the problems as-
sociated with popular exercise of zoning power, see id. at 1418-23, and would help prevent majori-
tarian abuse of that power. For additional discussion of direct democracy and zoning, see
Developments in the Law-Zoning, supra at 1528-42; Comment, The Initiative and Referendum's
Use in Zoning, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 74 (1976); Note, supra note 11; Note, The Proper Use of Refer-
enda in Rezoning, supra note 94.
133. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
134. Id. at 670. While addressing the due process issue, the Court avoided any explicit recogni-
tion of the equal protection issues raised by the use of popular decisionmaking, notwithstanding that
the case "presented the issue of direct democracy in almost unmistakable form." Sager, supra note
69, at 1408.
135. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740
(1975).
136. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. at 672. For criticism of the
Court's decision, see, e.g., Sager, supra note 69; Note, supra note 94, at 828-31.
137. 426 U.S. at 673.
138. See note 132 supra. The dissenters concluded that procedural due process requirements
were applicable, because the case involved "the status of a single small parcel owned by a single
.person.' "426 U.S. at 680 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that "the opportunity to
apply for an amendment [of the zoning ordinance] is an aspect of property ownership protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 683 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. The Court cited cases (e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944)) holding that "a
congressional delegation of power to a regulatory entity must be accompanied by discernible stan-
dards." 426 U.S. at 675.
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tion of power, we deal with a power reserved by the people to them-
selves.' 140 The Court distinguished Eubank and Roberge as involving a
delegation "to a narrow segment of the community, not to the people at
large."'41
The Court's decision in Eastlake thus substantially limits the force of
any due process challenge to direct democracy.1 42 In addition, Eastlake,
like James, reflects the Court's deferential posture toward direct democ-
racy. In rejecting the due process challenge to the referendum provision,
the Court characterized the referendum as " 'an exercise by the voters of
their traditional right through direct legislation to override the views of
their elected representatives,' ",143 and "a classic demonstration of
'devotion to democracy.' "144 As a result of this posture, judicial prohibi-
tion of the use of initiatives or referenda as violative of either the equal
protection or due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is an un-
likely source of protection for those threatened with majoritarian abuse of
direct democracy. 145
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LAWS ENACTED BY POPULAR
VOTE-A PROPOSED DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK
A. Current Status of Judicial Review of Laws Enacted by Popular Vote
In Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 146 the United States Su-
preme Court invalidated a state legislative apportionment plan which had
been adopted through the initiative process. With regard to the
constitutional significance of enactment by the people, the Court stated:
"Manifestly, the fact that an apportionment plan is adopted in a popular
referendum is insufficient to sustain its constitutionality or to induce a
140. Id. (footnote omitted).
141. Id. at 677 (emphasis in original).
142. State courts are a possible forum for such due process arguments. However. on remand.
the Ohio Supreme Court declined to depart from the outcome reached by the United States Supreme
Court. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 48 Ohio St. 2d 47, 356 N.E.2d 499. 500
(1976) (per curiam) (on remand).
143. 426 U.S. at 678 (quoting from Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union
City, 424 F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1970)).
144. Id. at 679.
145. See notes 133-142 and accompanying text supra.
After analyzing Eastlake in conjunction with Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), Professor
Sager concluded that the two cases "can be understood as consistent products of the view that the
legislative facilitation of the aggregate will of the members of a community is to predominate over
virtually all other possible concerns in the land use planning process .... [Miajority will-however
insular, unjust, or irrational-prevails." Sager, supra note 69, at 1425.
146. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
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court of equity to refuse to act. . . . A citizen's constitutional rights can
hardly be infringed simply because a majority of the people choose that it
be."'147 According to the Court in Lucas, laws enacted by popular vote
should be subject to the same level of judicial review as legislatively en-
acted measures. 148
This degree of protection for adversely affected minorities was suffi-
cient in Reitman v. Mulkey. 149 There the Court held unconstitutional a
provision of the California State Constitution,150 adopted by initiative,
which prohibited the state from denying the right of any person to sell,
lease, or rent his real property to such person as he, in his absolute dis-
cretion, chooses. The Court affirmed the holdings of the California Su-
preme Court that the intent of the provision was to "authorize private ra-
cial discriminations in the housing market,"' 151 and that the provision
would "significantly involve the State in private racial discrimination
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment."' 152 The Court specifically noted
that "[t]he assessment of §26 by the California court is similar to what
this Court has done in appraising state statutes or other official actions in
other contexts. ' 153 The use of an intitiative to adopt the provision did not
enter into the Court's opinion.154
Notwithstanding the protection afforded minority rights in Lucas and
Reitman, 155 judicial review of popularly enacted legislation is presently
147. Id. at 736-37 (citation and footnote omitted).
148. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969) (Court engages in scrutiny of the justifi-
cations offered in behalf of legislation enacted by popular referendum).
149. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (law en-
acted by initiative which required education in public schools held unconstitutional).
150. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 26.
151. 387 U.S. at 376.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 379. The major issue in the case was presented as a state action question. The
majority concluded that "the Section will significantly encourage and involve the State in private
discriminations." Id. at 381. The dissenters accused the Court of "contriving a new and ill-defined
constitutional concept." Id. at 396 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For discussions of the case, see Black,
The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Proposition 14: An
Extension of Prohibited "State Action," 19 STAN. L. REv. 232 (1966).
154. Justice White's majority opinion noted that the provision was adopted through the initiative
process, id. at 370-71, but made no further mention of that fact. Justice Douglas, in a concurring
opinion, responded to the argument that the Court should not upset an enactment of the people with
the quotation from James Madison which is included in note 65 supra. Id. at 387.
155. Several district courts relied on Reitman to enjoin exercises in direct democracy designed
to repeal or prevent the enactment of open housing legislation. See Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F.
Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich.), rev'd, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980; Holmes v.
Leadbetter, 294 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Mich. 1968); Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264
(E.D. Wis. 1968). The primary basis for the district courts' holdings in these cases was that the ref-
erendum would constitute state action authorizing or encouraging racial discrimination. This ap-
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inadequate because it fails to consider the potential abuse of minority in-
terests presented by such legislation. Except in those cases where some
heightened level of scrutiny is triggered, classifications contained in leg-
islation are subject only to cursory equal protection examination under
the "rational basis" test. 156 Central to this branch of equal protection
analysis is a judicial presumption of constitutionality, premised upon the
safeguards inherent in the representational legislative process. 157 To treat
initiatives in the same manner as other legislation is to afford them a pre-
sumption of constitutionality despite the absence of the very safeguards
upon which that presumption is based. 158
Moreover, even if a law enacted by initiative clearly has a dispropor-
proach was rejected by the Sixth Circuit in Ranjel and by the Fourth Circuit in Spaulding v. Blair,
403 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1968). See Seeley, supra note 43, at 891-93 (analysis of Spaulding).
156. The test has recently been explained as follows:
[T]his case, like equal protection cases recurringly do, involves a legislative classification con-
tained in a statute. . . . In an equal protection case of this type . . . those challenging the
legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classifica-
tion is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental deci-
sionmaker.
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 110-11 (1979). See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483.
487 (1955) (statute upheld as against due process attack on the basis of what legislature "might have
concluded"); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). See generally
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-3 (1978) (discussion of the "conceivable basis" test).
157. "In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with balancing
numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions.
absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). See also Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Pro-
tection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 44 (1972).
A different justification for the presumption of constitutionality afforded legislative actions is
premised on the doctrine of separation of powers. Judicial deference to the legislature results not
because of any safeguards in the legislative process, but simply because it is not the function of the
courts to legislate. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 778 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.. dissent-
ing). If courts defer to legislatures in order to preserve a separation of powers, the same degree of
deference should be afforded to the people when they legislate through the initiative process.
However, extreme judicial deference, see note 156 supra, in the case of an initiative is inconsis-
tent with the protections of the fourteenth amendment:
The Equal Protection Clause of [the fourteenth] amendment does, however, deny to States the
power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into differ-
ent classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A
classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all personssimilarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike."
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412.
415 (1920)). See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring). By creating a strong presumption of constitutionality at the outset, extreme judicial
deference virtually eliminates the requirement of rational classification, and can be justified only by
safeguards inherent in the representative legislative process.
158. See Part II supra.
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tionate impact on a minority group protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment, current equal protection doctrine will be difficult to apply if the
law is neutral on its face.159 An equal protection challenge to a facially
nondiscriminatory statute requires a showing not merely of a
discriminatory impact, but also of discriminatory motive, 160 and hence
an inquiry into legislative purpose is mandated. Because that inquiry of-
ten would be speculative in the case of legislation enacted by vote of the
people on an initiative, 161 effective judicial review is improbable.
The adequacy of judicial review of laws enacted by initiative is also
open to question because of the Court's position in James v. Valtierra162
and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 163 The deferential
attitude toward the exercise of popular sovereignty which these cases ex-
hibited, 164 coupled with the traditional deference of the rational basis
test, makes it unlikely that the courts, in reviewing laws enacted by ini-
159. See Sager, supra note 69, at 1421. See also Yarborough v. City of Warren, 383 F. Supp.
676 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (equal protection challenge to referendum terminating urban renewal pro-
gram rejected).
160. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976) (plaintiffs' claim based on fifth
amendment).
161. The same problem is present in judicial review of zoning ordinances in which a court is
called upon to apply a standard of arbitrary and capricious conduct. See Note, The Proper Use of
Referenda in Rezoning, supra note 94, at 837-38. Cf. Kanter Corp. v. City of Forest Park, 53 Ohio
Misc. 4, 371 N.E.2d 848 (Ct. C.P. 1977) (upholding denial of zoning amendment by referendum).
Anything more than speculation as to intent, motivation, or factors considered by the voters would
seem to involve an impermissible invasion of the voting booth:
If the voters' purpose is to be found here, then, it would seem to require far more than a
simple application of objective standards. If the true motive is to be ascertained not through
speculation but through a probing of the private attitudes of the voters, the inquiry would entail
an intolerable invasion of the privacy that must protect an exercise of the franchise.
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 295 (9th
Cir. 1970). See Sager, supra note 69, at 1421. The courts have resorted to factors other than the
intent of the voters to ascertain legislative intent behind an initiative. See note 52 and accompanying
text supra.
The problem of determining the intent behind an initiative was confronted in Seattle School Dis-
trict v. State of Washington, No. C78-753V (W.D. Wash. June 15, 1979) (mem.), appeal
docketed, No. 79-4676 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 1979). For a discussion of the case, see note 87 supra.
The court observed that "as to [the] subjective intent [of the voters] the secret ballot raises an im-
penetrable barrier." Mem. at 6. However, the court used the five factors enunciated in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), to determine the intent
behind the initiative. The court concluded that: "The racially disproportionate impact of the initiative
when coupled with its historical background, the sequence of events leading to its adoption and the
departure from the procedural norm demonstrate that a racially discriminatory intent or purpose was
at least one motivating factor in the adoption of the initiative." Mem. Op. at 11-12.
162. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
163. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
164. See notes 123-26 and 142-45 and accompanying text supra.
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tiative, will provide an adequate check on potential abuses of direct de-
mocracy.
B. The Doctrinal Justification for Heightened Scrutiny
In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 165 Justice Stone, writing
for the Court, suggested several areas where legislation should not be ac-
corded the usual presumption of constitutionality, but instead should be
subjected to more exacting judicial review. Footnote 4 states in part:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judi-
cial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment
than are most other types of legislation ...
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review
of statutes directed at particular religious ... or national ... or racial mi-
norities ... : whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial in-
quiry. 166
In suggesting that "legislation which restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation" should be subjected to more exacting scrutiny, Justice Stone
cited cases involving "restrictions upon the right to vote, . . .restraints
upon the dissemination of information, . . . interferences with political
organizations, . . . [and] prohibition of peaceful assembly .... -167 The
principle he established is that the fourteenth amendment requires judi-
cial cognizance of the effect of legislation on the operation of political
processes, and that, when that effect is to constrict political processes
which serve as checks on undesirable legislative actions, heightened
scrutiny is justified.
165. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
166. Id. at 152-53 n.4. It is apparent from the language of the footnote that heightened scrutiny
is closely related to the nature of the political process which produced the legislation in question.
This emphasis on political process has been observed by Professor Ely:
[B]oth Carolene Products themes are concerned with participation: They ask us to focus not on
whether this or that substantive value is unusually important or fundamental, but rather on
whether the opportunity to participate either in the political processes by which values are ap-
propriately identified and accommodated, or in the accommodation those processes have
reached, has been unduly constricted.
Ely, supra note 64, at 456.
167. 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
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These same considerations justify heightened judicial scrutiny of initi-
atives. 168 Initiatives reduce minority input into the legislative process and
restrict the process of representative government, which was designed, in
part, to protect minority interests. While a minority still participates in
the legislative process when an initiative is used to enact a law, and thus
is not deprived of a voice in the process to the same extent as in the case
of a denial of voting rights, that participation is constricted, since there is
no assurance of consideration of minority viewpoints and no possibility
of compromise. 169 Similarly, while speech and assembly intended to af-
fect the outcome of an initiative are not restricted per se, their effective-
ness is curtailed.
The final paragraph of footnote 4 explicitly refers to a condition
"which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities" as one which may call
for heightened scrutiny. 170 Minorities are normally protected in the legis-
lative process by their representation in legislative assemblies and their
right to have their views considered therein. Six years after its Carolene
Products decision, the Court had occasion to comment upon the duty of a
legislature to protect the interests of all of its constituents:
It is a principle of general application that the exercise of granted power
to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to
exercise the power in their interest and behalf. ...
[ ,T]he Constitution imposes [a duty] upon a legislature to give equal
protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates. 17'
In the case of an initiative, where each individual can vote his own
preference, there is no room for an assumption that the majority gives
equal protection to the interests of the minority. Because initiatives do
not merely curtail, but circumvent political processes (representative
government) which are relied upon to protect minorities, they should be
subject to heightened scrutiny under the rationale of the Carolene Prod-
ucts footnote.
Professor Tribe has noted that "the tendency has been to explain the
occasions for strict scrutiny in terms of reasons to avoid deference to pol-
168. Justice Black's majority opinion in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971), noted
that "a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny equal pro-
tection." The argument here is not that the initiative procedure is itself a denial of equal protection,
but that because it lacks fundamental safeguards for minority rights, resulting legislation should be
subject to careful judicial review under the equal protection clause.
169. See Part II-B supra.
170. See text accompanying note 166 supra.
171. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
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itics. ' ' 172 Where such reasons exist, as here, a court could either invali-
date the political process involved, or it could "leav[e] the political
process intact but strik[e] down particular political outcomes as insuffi-
ciently justified .... -173 The latter approach should be employed in re-
viewing legislation enacted by initiative. 174
C. Proposed Standard of Review
The standard of review for laws enacted by initiative should require
statutory classifications to have a substantial relationship to a legitimate,
articulated state purpose. 175 This standard would protect minorities from
majoritarian abuse of direct democracy in two ways. First, the require-
ment that the purpose of the law be articulated 176 should avoid problems
involved in an inquiry into the voters' intent177 and promote
accountability of the initiative process. 178 "After-the-fact rationaliza-
172. L. TRIBE, supra note 156, § 16-6, at 1001.
173. Id.
174. The California court, in holding a rent control ordinance adopted by initiative to be an un-
reasonable exercise of local police power, stated: "Judicial protection of landlords' rights with re-
spect to rent control enactments such as the present charter amendment lies not in placing arbitrary
restrictions upon the initiative power but in measuring the substance of the enactment's provisions
against overriding constitutional and statutory requirements." Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley. 17
Cal. 3d 129, 146, 550 P.2d 1001, 1014, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 478 (1976).
175. The "substantial relationship" test has been used by the Court in reviewing some types of
legislation. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979) ("classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those ob-
jectives"). The standard has been characterized as an intermediate level of review, L. TRIBE. supra
note 156, at § 16-30, or as an element of "newer equal protection," Gunther. supra note 157. Al-
though the Court has applied it in reviewing only certain classifications, most notably those based on
gender, the substantial relationship test should be applied in every case in which the interests of a
minority group are adversely affected through the initiative process. See note 181 infra.
176. An articulated purpose could be found in a preamble to, or the text of the legislation, in
statements by proponents in an official voters' pamphlet, or in an opinion of a state court or attorney
general. Professor Gunther has argued that:
If the Court were to require an articulation of purpose from an authoritative state source, rather
than hypothesizing one of its own, there would at least be indirect pressure on the legislature to
state its own reasons for selecting particular means and classifications. And that pressure would
further the political process aims of the moderate intervention model.
Gunther, supra note 157, at 47. A requirement of an articulated purpose for initiatives likewise
should bring pressure to bear on proponents to state their own purposes for the legislation.
Where there is evidence as to the actual intent of the voters it also should be considered. See Reit-
man v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1967) (accepting finding of California Supreme Court,
"armed as it were with the knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning the passage and
potential impact of § 26," that the purpose of the measure was to authorize and encourage private
discrimination); note 178 infra.
177. See note 161 and accompanying text supra.
178. Professor Tribe has described the conventional application of the requirement that a law be
justified in light of its actual purposes:
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tions" 179 should not be permitted to justify an invasion of minority inter-
ests by a majority.
Second, the requirement of a substantial relationship between the
means employed and the objective to be achieved by a law enacted by
initiative would provide an effective restraint upon arbitrary exercises of
majority power. Professor Gunther has observed:
A common defense of extreme judicial abdication is that the state has
considered the contending considerations. Too often the only assurance that
the state has thought about the issues is the judicial presumption that it has.
Means scrutiny would provide greater safeguards that the presumed process
corresponds to reality-and would give greater content to the underlying
premise for deferring to the state's resolution of the competing issues. 180
"Means scrutiny" of initiatives would prevent majorities from promoting
their own interests without adequately considering minority interests, 181
and thus would be an appropriate check on the inherent dangers of direct
democracy. 182
When either the nature of the classification challenged or the character of the deprivation at-
tacked warrants intermediate scrutiny, 'inquiry into the actual purposes' of the rule, as illumi-
nated by its language, its structure, and its history, warrants the rule's invalidation when it can
be defended only with considerations that did not in fact contribute to its enactment. In part,
such a principle can be explained as enhancing political accountability: a legislature or agency
that cannot count on the post-hoc rationalizations of those charged with responsibility to enforce
and defend its enactments or promulgations might be motivated to ventilate more fully the con-
siderations underlying those enactments.
L. TRIBE, supra note 156, § 16-30, at 1086 (footnotes omitted).
However, an articulated purpose for an initiative does not guarantee that that purpose motivated
the majority in enacting the law. In certain cases, where it would be unreasonable to conclude that
the law was enacted for the stated purpose, a court would be justified in rejecting the purpose
advanced. "[T]he mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield
which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme." Weinber-
ger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975). See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 449 (1972)
(deterrence of premarital sex could not "reasonably be regarded" as purpose of state statute prohibit-
ing sale or distribution of contraceptives to non-married persons).
179. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 653 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in
result).
180. Gunther, supra note 157, at 44.
181. Cases in which the Court has invalidated laws or regulations because of a lack of substan-
tial relationship between means and ends have involved the same type of majoritarian disregard for
individual and minority rights which is threatened by use of the initiative process. See Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (concern for orderly settlement of estates did not justify rule making it
impossible for illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from their fathers); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (concern for public health and safety did not justify prohibition of sales
of beer to 18-21 year old males while permitting sales to 18-21 year old females); Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (concern for administrative convenience did not justify absolute
prohibition of employment of aliens).
182. The "substantial relationship" standard advocated is not intended to provide a mechanical
test to be applied to initiatives, but is designed to assure that effective means scrutiny takes place and
to reject the extreme judicial deference associated with the rational basis standard. See note 156 su-
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V. CONCLUSION
The use of direct democracy to enact legislation presents a clash of two
fundamental values which are inherent in American political theory: (1)
that the people are sovereign and should govern by majority rule, and (2)
that individual and minority rights should be protected from majoritarian
abuse. 183 The reconciliation achieved by the framers of the Constitution
was centered upon representation-the people were sovereign, but actual
conduct of government was delegated to representatives who would rep-
resent the interests of all the people. The courts had the responsibility for
providing the final layer of protection for individual and minority rights
in reviewing the constitutionality of governmental action.
Initiatives arguably enhance the people's role in government, 84 but
they also undermine protections for individual and minority interests.
Prohibition of popular enactment of legislation would avoid the dangers
to minority rights but would unnecessarily sacrifice the democratic and
educational values of the initiative process. 185 However, the increasing
use of initiatives, coupled with judicial deference to expressions of ma-
jority will, needlessly endangers minority rights.
Heightened scrutiny of laws enacted by popular vote provides an ap-
pra. The concern is primarily with the intensity or level ofjudicial review of initiatives. "Decision in
this context, as in others, is very much a 'matter of degree,' . . . very much a matter of 'con-
sider[ing] the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be pro-
tecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.' " Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (sustaining a provision of the California Election Code).
For example, initiatives aimed at reform of representative governmental processes most likely
would be sustained under the substantial relationship test. Campaign reform, open public meetings
acts, and other legislation aimed at curbing political abuses advance important state interests, and the
only 'minority' interest adversely affected in many cases would be the interest of the wealthy in pur-
chasing political influence. Thus, one of the major uses of initiatives, see notes 20-22 and accompa-
nying text supra, and the use most consistent with the rationale for direct democracy-providing a
popular check on representative government-would not be hampered by heightened judicial scru-
tiny. Cf. Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974) (upholding public disclosure law
enacted by initiative).
Conversely, initiatives which are aimed at discrete and disadvantaged minority groups (whether or
not the classifications drawn trigger heightened scrutiny under existing equal protection analysis)
more likely would be subject to judicial invalidation, particularly as the importance of the interest
affected increases and the substantiality of the relationship of the classification to a legitimate state
purpose decreases. See note 181 supra.
183. "[T]he democratic ideals of equality and majority rule, which have served this Nation so
well in the past, are hardly of any less significance for the present and the future." Reynolds v. Sims.
377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
184. But see notes 86-91 and accompanying text supra.
185. There are circumstances where judicial review of the results of the initiative process would
be impractical as an effective restraint on direct democracy. In these instances prohibition of the ini-
tiative process, under either the due process or equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
would be appropriate. See Parts III-B & C supra.
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propriate reconciliation of these competing values. Initiatives would re-
main available as avenues for political reform and expression of popular
will, while at the same time protection would be provided against
majoritarian abuse of minority interests. The task the courts would be
called upon to perform, evaluating means in light of articulated purposes,
is one they have undertaken in other settings,186 and it is consistent with
the role of the judiciary as protector of individual and minority rights. 187
Fulfillment of that task in this setting is necessary to prevent the dangers
to minorities posed by circumvention of representative government and
to safeguard real liberty, which is "neither found in despotism or the ex-
tremes of democracy, but in moderate governments."' 188
Marc Slonim
James H. Lowe*
186. See note 181 supra.
187. It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court's deferential posture toward direct democracy has
been articulated in cases involving provisions for referenda, whereas in prior cases the Court was
willing to apply more conventional standards of constitutional adjudication to invalidate particular
laws enacted by initiative. Compare James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) and City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) with Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369(1967).
188. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENION, supra note 60, at 432 (A. Hamilton).
* A.B., 1968, Washington and Lee University; M.B.A., 1970, Harvard University; J.D., 1979,
University of Washington.
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